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The distinction between esoteric and exoteric readings of Plato will be revisited in this article with 
respect to two esoteric approaches: the German Tübingen School and the American Straussians (i.e., 
those interpreters who have been inspired by the work of Leo Strauss). There appears to be a joint 
motivation for these two approaches, namely, the critique of writing in the dialogue Phaedrus and 
especially Socrates’ objection that the written text speaks indiscriminately to every audience. While 
the Straussians claim that the Platonic dialogues are exempt from the critique because they exhibit the 
flexibility of oral speech, the Tübingen School relates the dialogues to an unwritten Platonic doctrine. 
In this article, I argue that both approaches rightly alert us to the significance and complexity of the 
critique of writing, yet provide one-sided readings which do not consider all of Socrates’ arguments 
and neglect the positions ascribed to Theuth and Thamus. When the different arguments are taken into 
account, the ambiguity of writing is revealed which does not allow for simple solutions concerning the 
status of the Platonic dialogues as written texts. 
 
 
The distinction between esoteric and exoteric readings guides one of the most 
fundamental controversies about how we should interpret texts; the predominant battle 
grounds for this controversy are the Platonic dialogues. In his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, Hegel writes: “Another difficulty is supposedly this: one distinguishes between 
exoteric and esoteric philosophy. Tennemann1 states (Vol. II, p. 220): ‘Plato makes use of this 
same right, to communicate only as much as he deemed advisable, and only to those whom he 
considered receptive.’ How naïve! It appears as if the philosopher was in posession of his 
ideas like external objects. However, thoughts are of an entirely different nature. The 
philosophical idea, to the contrary, owns the human being. When philosophers explicate 
philosophical subject-matters, they have to follow their ideas; they cannot keep them in their 
                                                 1
 W. G. Tennemann, to whose work History of Philosophy (vol. II) Hegel is referring here, is also mentioned by 
Szlezák as one of the earliest German representatives of the esoteric approach (PSP, 327). 
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 pocket.”2 Hegel is cited here because he brings up an argument against esoteric readings of 
Plato which is more convincing than many twentieth century objections. In this passage, 
Hegel conveys an important insight – leaving the polemical style aside – which is quite 
convincing from a phenomenological perspective: we do not own our ideas, but our ideas 
come to us; this is one of the decisive differences between ideas and objects. It would even be 
justified to say that the philosophical idea “owns” the human being because it holds us in its 
grip, haunts us, does not let go. Therefore, Hegel considers it naïve and inappropriate to 
assume that philosophers hold certain ideas back while presenting others.  
At the same time, the possibility of keeping a secret also needs to be acknowledged; 
keeping a secret is a human possibility, and we are certainly aware that keeping a secret never 
means the same as keeping an external object well hidden. Would the possibility of keeping 
secrets not undermine Hegel’s remark or prove it to be merely polemical? The statements 
which we keep as secrets usually concern facts or specific occurrences in the world and are 
thus quite different from philosophical ideas. Furthermore, a philosopher would usually be so 
compelled by his or her ideas that a very strong reason would be needed for not showing 
them. In the case of Socrates, even the prospect of death was no deterring factor. However, 
some proponents of the esoteric approach in the twentieth century, especially Leo Strauss, 
suggest that Plato would hide certain ideas for political reasons or perhaps because of 
Socrates’ destiny. 
In this article, two main esoteric approaches will be briefly introduced: the so-called 
Tübingen School (H.J. Krämer, K. Gaiser, T.A. Szlezák, etc.) and the Straussians (L. Strauss, 
S. Benardete, S. Rosen, etc.). “Straussians” is an expression used here simply to refer to those 
interpreters who have been influenced and inspired by the work of Leo Strauss. The fact that 
two very significant esoteric approaches emerge in the twentieth century, one in Germany, the 
other in the United States, confirms the significance of the esoteric/exoteric distinction. The 
two approaches cannot be compared in this article in any comprehensive sense, but will be 
examined with respect to their treatments of the critique of writing. It will turn out that the 
                                                 2
 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II, 21: “Eine andere Schwierigkeit soll die sein: man 
unterscheidet exoterische und esoterische Philosophie. Tennemann sagt (Bd. II, S. 220): >Platon bedient sich 
desselben Rechts, nur so viel, als er für gut fand, und nur denen mitzuteilen, welchen er Empfänglichkeit 
zutraute. (..)< Wie einfältig! Das sieht aus, als sei der Philosoph im Besitz seiner Gedanken wie der äußerlichen 
Dinge. Die Gedanken sind aber etwas ganz anderes. Die philosophische Idee besitzt umgekehrt den Menschen. 
Wenn Philosophen sich über philosophische Gegenstände explizieren, so müssen sie sich nach ihren Ideen 
richten; sie können sie nicht in der Tasche behalten.” 
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Tübingen School and Straussians give one-sided readings of this critique, focusing mostly on 
just one of the arguments put forth. The different ways in which this argument is interpreted 
accounts for some of the significant divergences between the two approaches. While the two 
esoteric approaches share their focus on the author and audience of the written text, the 
Straussians conclude that the Platonic dialogues have the “flexibility” of oral discourse if they 
are read in the appropriate manner. The Tübingen School, in contrast, is famous for its 
investigation of an unwritten doctrine while still trying to give room to the written dialogues. 
This article will come to conclude that both suggestions are untenable due to the ambiguity of 
the written text which the critique of writing reveals. 
Let me be clear from the outset about the fact that I deem the esoteric/exoteric 
distinction important and value the contributions made by the Tübingen School and the 
Straussians. Although several problems will be identified in the course of this article, the 
response cannot be to deny the esoteric/exoteric distinction or fall back behind it, as many 
analytic interpretations tend to. Strauss rightfully insists that it is dissatisfying and illegitimate 
to abstract from the dialogical format and read the statements made in the dialogues as 
constituting Plato’s position, a position which could then be dissected into arguments (CM, 
50).3 Instead, a response to the problems of the esoteric approaches needs to go through the 
esoteric/exoteric distinction, as it were. My interest lies with the motivation for the 
esoteric/exoteric distinction (which appears to be a joint one for the Tübingen School and the 
Straussians) and with examining how convincing the description of the distinction and the 
interpretative conclusions are.4 
                                                 3
 Rosen describes the predominant Plato scholarship during the times when he first developed his interpretative 
approach in the following way: “On the one hand it was held that Plato must be read as a child of his time, in 
accord with the hermeneutical presuppositions of the Geisteswissenschaften. On the other hand, the actual text 
was disregarded by the leading English-speaking scholars, who sought to extricate from the literary 
ornamentation a set of arguments, to be checked for logical validity by translation into the languages of formal 
set theory and predicate calculus or informal natural language semantics” (Rosen (1987), xi). Although the 
statement that analytic scholars “disregard” the actual text would better be formulated as “disregard whole 
portions of the text” (i.e., those which can be considered “literary ornamentation”), Rosen here points quite 
rightfully to the problem that an analytic reading cannot attend to the dialogue format, has severe difficulties 
when faced with the Platonic myths, and is forced to give an interpretation of the critique of writing which 
disregards writing’s essential ambiguity. 
4
 The two approaches can only be examined here in a brief and somewhat simplified fashion; book-length studies 
about each of them could be (and indeed have been) undertaken. The most representative literature of the 
Tübingen School can be found in Krämer (1959), Gaiser (1968 & 1980) and Szlezák (PSP). For a recent 
investigation of this movement, see Villers (2005) who shows how Szlezák’s approach makes up for several 
shortcomings of the original formulations in Krämer and Gaiser.  
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After outlining these two approaches by sketching some of their main claims and 
differences, the third part of the paper will examine how the esoteric approaches are based on 
interesting, yet somewhat one-sided or selective readings of the critique of writing in the 
Phaedrus. The fourth part will take up some neglected passages and arguments concerning 
the critique of writing. It will turn out that the dialogue gives a more balanced picture of 
writing and, albeit indirectly, reveals some of its strengths. Rather than forcing us to choose 
between the possibilities and dangers of the written text, writing turns out to be an essentially 
ambiguous phenomenon. 
 
I. The Tübingen School 
 
Usually, the position of the Tübingen School is identified with the search for Plato’s 
“Unwritten Doctrine” (as the title of Gaiser’s book has it)5. This search is motivated by 
Plato’s critique of writing in the Phaedrus, combined with the Seventh Letter (the authenticity 
of which seems reasonably reliable, although there is still some dispute) which states: “On 
this account no sensible man will venture to express his deepest thoughts in words, especially 
in a form which is unchangeable, as is true of written outlines” (343a). The first authors of the 
Tübingen School, Krämer and Gaiser, turn toward ancient authors who hint at certain Platonic 
doctrines (such as Aristotle’s remarks about a Platonic lecture “On the Good” as reported by 
Aristoxenus6). While it is interesting and thought-provoking that there seem to be certain 
clashes between the positions outlined in the dialogues and the Platonic doctrines as 
summarized, hinted at, or criticized by other ancient authors, it is obviously quite dissatisfying 
and methodologically unstable to turn away from the dialogues (or turn to them mainly in 
order to point to inconsistencies with the “unwritten doctrine”). Furthermore, Plato is far from 
presenting one definitive position in the dialogues. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Leo Strauss has presented his readings of Plato in a variety of studies, such as Strauss (CM, PAW, SPP, AAPL). 
The most important text by Seth Benardete, for our purposes, is the interpretation of the Phaedrus (RMP). 
Stanley Rosen lays out his approach quite well in Plato’s Symposium and explains in his recent Plato’s Republic 
how his reading of the Republic differs from Leo Strauss’ while still continuing the Straussian inspiration. 
5
 Gaiser (1968). Both Krämer and Gaiser were students of Wolfgang Schadewaldt’s; for a explanatory as well as 
criticial presentation of the original Tübingen School as a movement, see Gadamer (1968). 
6
 Aristoxenus, Elementa harmonica II, 30-31. According to Aristoxenus, this lecture contained the statement 
“Good is One” (which, as such, does not stand in conflict with the dialogues). For a translation and discussion of 
Aristoxenus’ text, see Gaiser (1980). 
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In response to these difficulties and the criticism raised against the Tübingen School, 
Thomas Alexander Szlezák develops the Tübingen School approach by attending exactly to 
and interpreting the dialogues against the background of the critique of writing. Szlezák 
provides a brief definition of the esoteric approach as “conveying knowledge in a way which 
is strictly orientated toward the needs of the addressee” (streng an den Bedürfnissen des 
Adressaten orientierte Art der Erkenntnisvermittlung) (PSP, 406). This would indeed be a 
plausible interpretation of and response to the observation that the written text is vulnerable to 
misunderstandings because it cannot choose to whom it speaks. At the same time, the 
difficulties of an esoteric approach, especially if it wants to take Plato’s written dialogues 
seriously, already shine forth in this definition: how can a written text convey “knowledge in 
a way which is strictly orientated toward the needs of the addressee”?! 
In the current article, the Tübingen School will be embodied predominantly by the 
work of Szlezák as an advanced representative. This has several advantages. Taking a more 
advanced representative of a certain school often means to take a certain position in its 
strongest or most convincing position, especially if the potential and actual criticism of this 
position has already been incorporated. This is undoubtedly the case for Szlezák; he engages 
explicitly with the criticism raised against the Tübingen School, especially by the prominent 
Anglosaxon interpreter Gregory Vlastos, and he also discusses the dialogue theory based on 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s work from which the Tübingen School distances itself. 
Furthermore, Szlezák’s approach is presented in a very clear and accessible fashion, and his 
monograph Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie presents his (methodological) 
standpoint, his engagement with the critique, an exemplary interpretation of various 
dialogues, including the Phaedrus, and several appendices in which the standpoint is 
defended against various charges.7 
 At the same time, the advanced state of Szlezák’s position might harbor a 
disadvantage since his standpoint is already a compromise which has emerged through the 
engagement with the criticism and counter-positions. It is a bit surprising, for example, that 
Szlezák names the dialogue theory emerging from Schleiermacher as the most important 
counter-position, yet states in his Preface that his approach is “based on Schleiermacher’s 
                                                 7
 Most helpful, to my mind, is Appendix I (PSP, 331-75) which discusses the modern dialogue theory by way of 
ten critical theses, showing various inconsistencies in its theoretical assumptions (a few of which are mentioned 
in this article). 
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dialogue hermeneutics, except for Schleiermacher’s unexamined anti-esoteric premise” (PSP, 
VI). In other places, this statement is qualified. It appears that Szlezák agrees with 
Schleiermacher concerning the significance of the dialogues and the necessity of undertaking 
a close reading of those. His disagreement with Schleiermacher emerges with 
Schleiermacher’s criticism of an esoteric reading of Plato and takes a more distinct form as 
Szlezák argues that Schleiermacher engages in (overly) subtle individual observations – 
presumably paying too much attention to detail – and provides an impression of a reflective 
approach while actually being rather “naïve” (PSP, 22).  
In a more detailed examination close to the end of his book, Szlezák engages with a 
number of problematic assumptions and consequences of the dialogue theory. The points 
which strike me as most plausible concern the failure of reading the critique of writing 
carefully enough and in detail, and the difficulties which emerge from overemphasizing the 
dialogue form thus taking the ‘early dialogues’ as exemplary (PSP, 337, 347 ff.). The focus 
on the dialogue character creates a need to dismiss some of the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ dialogues, 
or to read them against the grain. Unsurprisingly, there appears to be a tendency in dialogue 
hermeneutics to downplay the significance of the critique of writing and to claim that the 
dialogue form chosen by Plato evades the criticism. Szlezák defines what he describes as 
dialogue theory through the “minimal consensus” that the Platonic dialogue can replace the 
oral conversation or is at least in a substantially better position of doing so than all systematic 
presentation of philosophy (PSP, 332). While such a claim reflects the general observation 
that Plato wrote dialogues despite criticizing writing, it seems indeed impossible to distill 
such a thesis about the dialogue form from the Phaedrus; in that sense, Szlezák’s critique of 
Schleiermacher is justified. However, when we look at Szlezák’s own interpretation of the 
critique of writing and the Phaedrus more generally in the third section on this article, it will 
turn out that his interpretation also harbors certain problems. 
The details of Szlezák’s engagement with Schleiermacher’s dialogue hermeneutics, 
which identifies various problems and inner contradictions, cannot be discussed here. One of 
the inconsistencies concerns a “latent esoteric tendency” (PSP, 368) in Schleiermacher’s own 
interpretation because Schleiermacher states that “the only way in which the talk of esoteric 
and exoteric might be used here” would refer to the reader and his or her ability to attend to 
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the indirect or inner messages of the dialogues.8 According to Szlezák, this esoterism of 
reading presupposes the esoterism of writing. A careful reading is possible and necessary, 
according to Szlezák, only because Plato wanted to conceal certain messages from the 
superficial reading. This argument does not convince me; the conclusion that Plato wanted to 
hide something or deemed the true message of his writing only suitable to “a few” who are 
capable of developing a “secret interpretation” (PSP, 368) by no means immediately follows 
from Schleiermacher’s remark. Szlezák makes a statement about the author’s intentions, 
ascribing to Plato an intention of consciously wanting to hide something. Schleiermacher’s 
statement, in contrast, describes a general hermeneutic principle according to which we 
always interpret when we read a text, and the more carefully we read, the deeper our 
understanding. 
This controversy marks an interesting opposition since Szlezák attributes an “inner 
esoterism” (PSP, 368) to Schleiermacher. Such an inner esoterism would indeed just be a 
different way of formulating the hermeneutic principle, and it seems that Schleiermacher does 
not deem the formulation “esoteric” particularly useful, but states that if this term should be 
used and make sense at all, it would need to be used in the way he describes. Szlezák, in 
contrast, and ultimately the Tübingen School in general, is concerned with what could be 
called an ‘outer esoterism’ which relates mostly to the author. A certain careful attitude of the 
reader is required only as a result of and direct response to this ‘outer esoterism.’ It seems 
immediately obvious that such an ‘outer esoterism’ is much less stable and involves several 
assumptions about the author.9  
                                                 8
 Schleiermacher (1969), p. 16. 
9
 These problems are indirectly addressed in a footnote which Szlezák directs at H. Meißner’s Der tiefere Logos 
Platons. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der Widersprüche in Platons Werken. Heidelberg: C. 
Winter, 1978. interpretation of Plato, but which, interestingly, appears to hold just as well and perhaps more so 
for the Tübingen School. Szlezák identifies an error of logic in an argumentation which aims at a “deeper” 
interpretation of Plato’s texts.  
Statements about the text (‘Plato means A here, not B’) are not being separated from evaluating statements about 
such statements (‘It is the deeper interpretation that Plato means A here and not B’), but are systematically 
conflated such that one’s own assessment is attributed to Plato, for no reason, such that a type of statement 
emerges which appears to speak about the text, but instead contains a hidden self-evaluation (‘Plato means here 
that A is the deeper logos of this passage, even though he places B on the surface for the majority of readers’). 
(374, F. 77) 
This appears to be exactly the procedure and flaw of the Tübingen School, and especially of the version which 
Szlezák proposes. The esoteric approach itself is based on attributing hidden intentions to Plato (which, as we 
will see in the third section of this essay, cannot be deduced from the critique of writing). The reading suggested 
by the Tübingen School has to presume that ‘Plato means here that A is the deeper logos of this passage, even 
though he places B on the surface for the majority of readers.’ Szlezák accuses Meißner of failing to separate 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471   -    FFLCH/USP 
http://www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo,  v.7, n.1. p. 65-94, 2013. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p65-94
71
  
 
 
 
 
The true justification of an esoteric reading can only be accomplished with respect to 
specific dialogues, of course, and Szlezák provides his own, not uncontroversial reading of 
the Phaedrus to which we will return below. General methodological considerations as we 
have discussed them up to here are naturally more vulnerable to criticism, and it has even 
been argued (e.g., by Hegel) that a method can never be explained and justified in abstraction 
from its subject-matter. At the same time, Szlezák does not really attempt to outline a 
methodology of reading, also given his suspicions against hermeneutics. He is mostly arguing 
against the designated counter-position, the dialogue hermeneutics inspired by 
Schleiermacher. 
The controversial discussion of certain assumptions, convictions and conclusions of 
dialogue hermeneutics which Szlezák undertakes is certainly revealing in many ways and 
points to problems which emerge when overstating the dialogue character of Plato’s work to 
the extent that written dialogues appear exempt from the critique of writing altogether. 
However, Szlezák creates problems for his own approach which inevitably emerge when a 
certain position is defined mostly by way of contrasting it with a different one: the rejected 
position comes to indirectly determine the new position. Since Szlezák even tries to integrate 
some elements of Schleiermacher’s theory into his own approach, it becomes even more 
difficult to discern his esoteric approach as such.10   
More internally consistent appears the original theory of the Tübingen School. Yet an 
approach to Plato which requires turning away from the Platonic dialogues (and concentrating 
instead on short, rare, and overall not very elucidating remarks of other ancient authors) 
cannot be the final response. Rather, Szlezák’s integrative reading has a number of 
advantages. He returns us to the Platonic dialogues and alerts us to the importance of settings 
and characters. He urges us to read carefully and to allow for a reading on different levels. 
                                                                                                                                                        
between his own assessment and Plato’s intended meanings – but which reading could ever be entirely sure of 
having found Plato’s true intentions, especially under the assumption that Plato was purposefully hiding the 
deeper logos? 
10
 One instance where this conflict emerges is Szlezák vehement rejection of Vlastos’ criticism concerning 
Krämer, for the reason that Vlastos attributes to Krämer the position that Plato would write “false” statements 
when Krämer does not use the designation, “false.” Yet at the same time, Szlezák maintains (and unfortunately 
does not explain or elaborate) that Plato may have “held back certain important insights” (PSP, 340). A closer 
investigation of this difference would be very useful. From a phenomenological perspective, it is clear that 
making a “false” statement differs from “withholding” certain parts of information. Yet how does this distinction 
become manifest in Plato’s dialogue? And how do we make sure that we read a certain statement as withholding 
a deeper message rather than as a false statement? How can we avoid making the logical mistake which Szlezák 
describes, the mistake of attributing our own evaluations to Plato? 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471   -    FFLCH/USP 
http://www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo,  v.7, n.1. p. 65-94, 2013. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p65-94
72
 Furthermore, both his interpretations of the dialogues and his more general considerations are 
characterized by impressive clarity. Although it has turned out that neither his criticism of 
Schleiermacher’s dialogue nor his (somewhat dispersed) presentation of his own reading are 
fully convincing, the task of reading the Platonic dialogue with attention to frame, setting, and 
characters, and of distinguishing between different levels, remains important. One of the 
problems emerging from Szlezák’s approach is his unwillingness to focus on the level of 
reading, and instead focus on the level of writing, author’s intentions, or what I have called 
‘outer esoterism.’  
Before turning to Leo Strauss and his version of the esoteric approach, let me point to 
a certain blindness in Szlezák’s reading of Leo Strauss. In Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der 
Philosophie, Strauss is mentioned twice, in potentially opposite ways. Strauss (and A. Bloom, 
J. Klein, S. Rosen, where only the latter is really a Plato interpreter) is first mentioned – 
without any specific explanation or argument – as an American version of Schleiermacher’s 
dialogue theory (PSP, 331 & Fn. 3, 332). Yet later on, Strauss and the interpreters influenced 
by him are given as a rare example of modern interpreters who stay clear of attributing the 
modern will toward complete transparency to Plato (PSP, 367). This tension in Szlezák’s 
interpretation of Strauss and the Straussians is symptomatic of a tension which also occurs 
within Szlezák’s own methodology as he tries to integrate insights from the dialogue theory. 
While the Straussian reading of Plato also makes use of the esoteric/exoteric 
distinction, one important difference to the Tübingen School lies in the fact that Leo Strauss 
never attempted to search for an unwritten doctrine outside of the dialogues. This has been a 
further motivation to focus on Szlezák in this article, who returned the Tübingen School to the 
dialogues, as it were, and whose approach is thus closer to Strauss than Krämer and Gaiser 
could be. 
 
 
II. The Straussians 
 
Leo Strauss is a complex and controversial writer. We will not be concerned here with 
his political theory, but as much as possible only with his Plato interpretations, and more 
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specifically, with his way of approaching Plato.11 A couple of difficulties emerge right away: 
we cannot engage in detail with Strauss’ readings of specific dialogues except for certain 
exemplary moments and the one passage most relevant for our purposes, namely, the critique 
of writing. Therefore, some of Strauss’ general comments on writing and reading will need to 
be considered to obtain a sense of how he reads Plato; but those considerations usually relate 
to the history of philosophy in general and perhaps even to all written texts. Unlike the 
Tübingen School authors, Strauss is not exclusively a Plato scholar, which does not take from 
his impressive familiarity with the Platonic dialogues in the least. Another problem which will 
emerge with respect to Strauss’ interpretation of texts concerns the fact that he does not 
consider them from a strictly philosophical but rather from a political or sociological 
perspective.  
 Strauss suggests developing a “sociology of philosophy,” and since he is aware that 
this is an unusual proposal which might cause resistance, he explains that “one must turn to 
other ages, if not to other climates” to see the necessity for such a project (PAW, 8). The ages 
and climates to which Strauss turns are accessed through the Jewish and Islamic writings of 
the middle ages. This does not diminish the significance of such a sociology for our times 
since Strauss considers our times, or at least the twentieth century, as a time of crisis12 in 
which certain forms of writing might be in danger of persecution. So we can draw certain 
lessons from the middle ages, including the distinction between exoteric and esoteric teaching 
which Strauss encountered in Farabi’s Plato and the writings of Farabi’s successors. “Farabi’s 
Plato informs us about the most obvious and the crudest reason why this antiquated or 
forgotten distinction was needed. Philosophy and the philosophers were ‘in grave danger.’ 
Society did not recognize philosophy or the right of philosophizing” (PAW, 17). Accordingly, 
exoteric teaching becomes the “armor” which protects philosophy such that it can appear 
(PAW, 18). 
 The suggestion to consider the times in which certain philosophers were writing to 
determine whether they were in danger is problematic, and Strauss seems to be aware of this. 
                                                 11
 I would like to note that those who regard Strauss as an inspiration for a strand of neo-conservatism in 
American politics seem to engage little or not at all with his actual texts whereas those who study his texts 
carefully provide good arguments against such a connection. See especially Kauffmann (1997) and (2008).  
12
 Associations with Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy are not arbitrary: 
Strauss not only attended classes by Husserl and Heidegger but also engaged with them in his writings, including 
Husserl’s Crisis (SPPP, 36 f.) 
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This awareness might be one reason as to why he speaks of a sociology of philosophy, 
signifying that he is not always moving within the realm of philosophy. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be plausible to always examine the actual historical situation of writers before 
attending to their texts. For example, there are problems of access and reliability, especially 
where the danger or actuality of persecution is concerned: are we really able to find out who 
might have been persecuted? Strauss is wise enough, of course, not to suggest any such 
procedure, but he does describe certain ages and climates as more dangerous for philosophy. 
Overall, he seems to believe that we are well advised always to presume that a certain author 
might have been in danger of persecution, or might have written on different levels.  
This holds particularly for Plato, according to Strauss: “Farabi ascribed to Plato the 
view that in the Greek city the philosopher was in grave danger. In making this statement, he 
merely repeated what Plato himself had said” (PAW, 21). This statement is worth pondering 
for a moment. Strauss is here supporting Farabi’s position by pointing out that Farabi can fall 
back on what Plato himself had said. It seems intuitively right that Plato indeed believed the 
philosopher to be in danger in the city; to state the obvious, we can barely imagine what it 
must have meant for him to witness the trial of Socrates. There are indeed several comments 
in the dialogues about the dangers for the philosopher to engage in or get entangled in 
political matters.13 Nevertheless the manner in which Strauss presents his argument does 
strike me as problematic. First, he does not provide any textual evidence for his statement at 
this point (and it should not be the reader’s task to search for it in other texts by Strauss where 
some more or less direct evidence could be found). The statement opens and closes in a rather 
abrupt fashion, and such abruptness characterizes quite a number of Strauss’ claims.14 
Second, Strauss himself has criticized quite vehemently any attempt to attribute claims from 
the dialogues to Plato as something he ‘himself had said.’ Strauss goes so far as to compare 
the utterances of interlocutors in the Platonic dialogues to the utterances of protagonists in 
Shakespeare’s dramas which we certainly would not read as representing Shakespeare’s own 
standpoint (CM, 50). Third, it is exactly to Strauss’ credit to have pointed out that the ideal 
city, in the Republic, is a city founded “in speech, i.e., not in deed” (AAPL, 1). The ideal city 
can thus not be read as evidence of the dangers which the philosophers face in the city; 
                                                 13
 Perhaps most prominently: Apology 32e. 
14
 We will see below that the same holds for Seth Benardete. 
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similar complications arise for passages about philosophy and politics in some of the other 
dialogues. 
Overall, Strauss would perhaps argue that it does not really matter whether a certain 
writer was in any way endangered since our task remains the same in any case: to read as 
carefully as possible.15 Strauss never claims to have found the reading that would be correct 
and comprehensive; he states in relation to Heidegger, who appears to believe that nobody has 
understood him adequately: “I believe he is right, for is the same not also true, more or less, 
of all outstanding thinkers? This does not dispense us, however, from taking a stand toward 
him, for we do this at any rate implicitly; in doing it explicitly, we run no greater risk than 
exposing ourselves to ridicule and perhaps receiving needed instruction” (SPP, 30).16 
Statements like these, which exhibit a certain modesty in presenting philosophical reading as 
an ongoing process always in need of correction constitute an interesting supplement to 
Strauss’ strong and daring claims about Platonic writing. This combination also makes it 
difficult to critique Strauss’ method of reading, especially since he presents his methodology 
in practice rather than in theory. 
One of the most famous results of Strauss’ Plato interpretations also has implications 
for the critique of writing and the question as to how Plato should be read. The Republic, 
Strauss argues, does not show what a city should look like, but what it would need to look like 
in order to accommodate our human needs, including the erotic needs.17 Since it turns out that 
a city constructed in this fashion is impossible, Plato allows us instead to see “the essential 
limits, the nature, of the city” (CM, 138). This result, which can only be presented rather than 
explained here, points to the clash between philosophy and politics. To put it in terms other 
than Strauss’, politics has to accommodate the physical needs of the people and has to make 
                                                 15
 This issue is somewhat similar to the question concerning the authenticity of Plato’s writings. Drew Hyland 
reports having heard from Stanley Rosen that Strauss would explain to his students how our task as readers 
would remain unchanged even if each one of Platonic dialogues was actually written by a different author 
(Hyland (2008), p. 6). 
16
 See also the following statement by Strauss, about Socrates: “The doctrine of ideas which Socrates expounds 
to his interlocutors is very hard to understand; to begin with, it is utterly incredible, not to say that it appears to 
be fantastic. (…) No one has ever succeeded in giving a satisfactory or clear account of this doctrine of ideas” 
(CM, 119). 
17
 Emmanuel Levinas would argue that Strauss misunderstands the nature of the erotic if he connects it with the 
needs for food and drink. According to Levinas’s analyses, there is an essential difference between needs, such 
as the need for drink and food, which are satiable, and insatiable desire for the Other. Erotic love holds an 
ambiguous position since it has elements of need as well as desire (TI). Levinas sees his analyses confirmed in 
Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus.  
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 compromises because of this necessity. Politics can thus not fully adhere to philosophical 
principles; certain clashes between political decisions and highest principles, especially 
ethical principles, are inevitable. This is admittedly not quite the conclusion which Strauss 
draws, but the inevitable conflict between philosophy and politics has been highlighted here 
to show that the inextricable link between politics and philosophy which determines Strauss’ 
readings is questionable in light of his own reading of the Republic. It might be important to 
examine the political situation of a writer and engage in a sociology of philosophy, but such 
examinations can never be sufficient for an understanding of the philosophical content. The 
political perspective is only one of many perspectives to be taken toward a philosophical text, 
and if it is highlighted at the expense of other perspectives, a one-sided picture will arise. 
Strauss’ interpretations bring out several interesting facets of the Platonic dialogues, 
and he has been more daring and more explicit than the traditional Plato scholars. Yet it is 
sometimes difficult to argue with his claims, especially when he does not develop them in 
detail. Similar considerations hold for Strauss’ methodology or his interpretative approach 
which prove difficult to assess because he does not formulate his method as explicitly as 
Szlezák (who, despite giving detailed justification of his method, remains too focused on the 
hermeneutical counter-position, as we saw). Like the Tübingen School, Strauss assumes that 
Plato was hiding certain messages. While Strauss gives a more detailed account of the need 
for an exoteric teaching as philosophy’s “armor,” his account creates new problems because 
either it holds for all writers, or we face the complex project of determining which writers 
might have been potential victims of persecution. And even if we limit the focus to Plato (as 
the concentration of the current article), it seems an unnecessarily strong assumption to make 
that Plato was indeed (purposefully) hiding something in his dialogues. However, both the 
assumption that Plato was hiding messages and the political perspective taken by Strauss do 
not appear absolutely essential to the way of reading Plato which he inaugurated, or at least 
they are much less present in interpreters like Benardete and Rosen. 
In contrast to the Tübingen School, Strauss makes some statements which place him in 
close proximity to Schleiermacher. Strauss considers an examination of the dialogue format 
essential to any reading of Plato, and with respect to the critique of writing he states: “The 
Platonic dialogue, if properly read, reveals itself to possess the flexibility or adaptability of 
oral communication” (CM, 53). Like Schleiermacher, Strauss thus believes that the critique of 
writing does not apply to the Platonic dialogue or that the Platonic dialogue is a response to 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471   -    FFLCH/USP 
http://www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo,  v.7, n.1. p. 65-94, 2013. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p65-94
77
 the precarious status of writing. Yet unlike Schleiermacher, Strauss attributes a political or 
sociological significance to the dialogue format: “The literary question properly understood is 
the question of the relation between society and philosophy” (CM, 52). For Strauss, what 
appears to be an aesthetical question is ultimately a sociological or political one since the 
relation between society and philosophy determines how a writer in a given epoch can write. 
Here, Strauss parts ways quite radically with the dialogue hermeneutics, and the difference is 
also related to the emphasis on the writer rather than reader which characterizes esoteric 
approaches.  
Slzezák and Strauss both locate the justification of the esoteric approach on the side of 
the writer. It is only because something has been hidden by the writer that requirements are 
imposed on the reader. This is the most important commonality of the two esoteric schools 
presented here, and at the same time, their greatest weakness, to my mind. Does it not follow 
from the critique of writing that questions about the writer’s intention can exactly not be 
answered with any certainty, and that what we are left with are the written text and the 
reader’s responsibility? The possibility of the writer conveying messages on different levels is 
certainly worth noting, and it is also plausible that the dialogue format can accommodate such 
a possibility. But both the Tübingen School and Leo Strauss appear to consider this possibility 
a certainty, or certain enough to let it motivate their esoteric approaches.  
 
III. Esoteric Approaches and the Critique of Writing 
 
At this point, we will abandon the more general methodological discussion and turn to 
a specific passage: the critique of writing. The critique of writing by way of the myth of 
Theuth occurs as Socrates sets out to examine a question still left open: “What’s left, then, is 
aptness and ineptness in connection with writing” (274b). The context in which this comment 
arises will be bracketed for now; we will return to it in the next section. The myth goes that 
Theuth, a very creative divinity, invented various arts, such as the art of the number, i.e., 
arithmetic, but also the art of the letter, i.e., writing. As he presents the art of writing to the 
Egyptian king Thamus, Theuth calls it “a potion (pharmakon) for memory and for wisdom” 
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 (275a).18 Thamus finds himself disagreeing on both accounts. First, writing encourages 
forgetting since people will rely on what has been written rather than practice their memory. 
Thamus also points out that writing is something external whereas memory is inside us. 
Second, writing does not make people wiser. Thamus claims that students will be provided 
“with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality” because they “will hear many things 
without being properly taught” (275a).  
 After Thamus’ two objections, Socrates follows up with his own interpretation of the 
myth. Socrates first states that writing can only serve as a reminder for those who already 
know what the writing is about. He gives two arguments for this claim. First, writing 
resembles painting, and the written text, like a painting, is silent and signifies the same thing 
forever. Second, the written text “rolls about everywhere” and speaks to everybody 
indiscriminately. It is helpless and “always needs its father’s support” (275e). Socrates 
continues his criticism by way of a direct comparison between speech and writing, 
introducing speech as the better and more capable brother of writing which avoids the pitfalls 
of the written letter. Phaedrus concludes that speech is “living, breathing discourse” of which 
the written discourse is only an image (276a). 
 These four arguments, two by Thamus, two by Socrates,19 summarized here in the 
briefest form, receive different treatment by the two schools of esoteric approaches. We will 
see that both the Tübingen School and the Straussians focus predominantly on Socrates’ 
second argument; yet they do so in different ways and with different conclusions. It is not 
surprising that Socrates’ second argument serves as the main basis for the esoteric approaches 
since both schools claim that it is because of the indiscriminate general audience that Plato 
decided to hide certain messages in his dialogues. However, this reliance on Socrates’ second 
argument needs to be examined, both with respect to how the argument is being read and with 
respect to the neglected other arguments.  
                                                 18
 Jacques Derrida has provided a detailed and famous interpretation of the expression “pharmakon” in his 
“Plato’s Pharmacy” (in Disseminations). I will refrain from engaging with Derrida’s text in the current article 
because Derrida’s interpretation is too complex to allow treatment in a marginal fashion, and his questions are 
rather different from the ones pursued in the current article. See my [removed for blind review] for a discussion 
of Derrida’s interpretation with respect to the question of ambiguity. 
19
 Hyland considers the final part of Socrates’ explanation a third argument: written texts “cannot by themselves 
sustain the long dwelling together that philosophy would require” (Hyland (2008), p. 130). Yet it is not clear 
whether this is a further argument or rather a continuation of the comparison between speech and writing; in any 
case, the point appears not as important for our purposes in the current essay (and would require a more detailed 
interpretation, considering the nature of philosophy and dialectic). 
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 Szlezák points out that a book cannot choose its audience whereas the success of 
dialectic depends on picking the right partner, as Socrates emphasizes in the final part of his 
interpretation (PSP, 16). After interpreting the critique of writing, Szlezák asks what 
conclusions we can draw for reading the Platonic dialogues. He repeats again that the critique 
of writing provides arguments against Schleiermacher’s dialogue hermeneutics and that 
Schleiermacher and his followers do not seem to take the critique of writing seriously. 
Szlezák’s positive conclusions for reading the dialogues remain sketchy; one rather curious 
suggestion concerns a typology of dialogues and dialogue passages which would point to the 
fact that something is missing in the dialogues (PSP, 22). Perhaps Szlezák is so brief in his 
conclusions here because he realizes that a more detailed treatment would lead him to the 
conclusions drawn by the traditional Tübingen School and would not coincide with his 
intention of reading the dialogues carefully. 
 Notably, Szlezák points out that the interpretation of the critique of writing needs to be 
confirmed by or checked against the “whole of the Phaedrus” (PSP, 23). This is a very 
important reminder (which will also guide the interpretation provided in the next section of 
the current article). However, Szlezák gives a peculiar formulation of the dialogue’s goal, 
claiming that the goal consists in “winning the young Phaedrus over for the philosophical 
life” (PSP, 24). Szlezák then proceeds to ask what kind of person Phaedrus is: a literature 
buff. This formulation of the dialogue’s goal provides an example of how the esoteric 
approach can lead to a misleading reading, to my mind. Szlezák shares with the Straussians a 
special focus on the dialogue setting and interlocutors. Such an emphasis is indeed helpful; 
yet we must not neglect the fact that we are dealing with a written dialogue, a written text, 
which speaks to its readers. If the dialogue was indeed just happening between Socrates and 
Phaedrus, Szlezák’s interpretation would be quite justified: Socrates is trying to convince 
Phaedrus of the philosophical life. Yet it is Plato who writes this dialogue down for us, the 
readers, and it is thus not incidental that the speeches in the first part are about Eros and the 
discussion in the second part about rhetoric. The goal of the dialogue might consist in 
showing the connection between Eros and logos, or in showing how philosophy harbors both 
those elements and is itself the link between Eros and logos. The question concerning the 
theme and goal of the Phaedrus cannot be explored here in detail, but it should be obvious 
that the dialogue treats of more than the conversion of Phaedrus to the philosophical life. 
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  To be sure, Szlezák presents Phaedrus as the representative of a certain kind of person, 
not just as Phaedrus, the individual. But my point is that in the case of a written text, 
background information about the interlocutors and their situation can only provide additional 
help and material; it must not detract from the written text itself, nor must it be used like a 
secret ‘key’ to understanding the dialogue.20 When attention to interlocutors and setting is 
taken too far, an antiplatonic focus on specific people and events arises (– although when 
applied in moderation, this focus balances out the prevalent impression of Platonism as 
concerned with universal forms). Furthermore, if the events in the dialogues are taken as 
interactions between people rather than as a staged dialogue which has been written down, 
there is a danger of abandoning the esoteric insight that the dialogues can be read on different 
levels. The interlocutors are important; but if Socrates merely wanted to convince Phaedrus, it 
would not be worth our sustained attention.  
 In sum, the Tübingen School does not provide a detailed and multi-faceted 
interpretation of the critique of writing (and Szlezák’s attempt at locating the critique of 
writing with respect to the dialogue as a whole is questionable, as we have seen). As already 
indicated before, Szlezák’s attempt to combine the inspirations of the Tübingen School with a 
careful reading of the dialogues creates internal tensions which become manifest within his 
interpretations. The traditional representatives of the Tübingen School, Krämer and Gaiser, do 
not provide a detailed interpretation of the critique of writing because they are mainly 
interested in the results which emerge from combining this critique with the Seventh Letter.21 
Ultimately, the critique of writing then only provides additional evidence, confirming the 
                                                 20
 A different example of the procedure discussed here can be found in Hyland (2002). Hyland argues that, in the 
Phaedo, Socrates brings up proofs for the immortality of the soul because his interlocutors are mostly 
Pythagoreans, and because he knows that these proofs are likely to have a calming effect on them (given that 
they are crying about his impending death, which makes a philosophical conversation impossible). Yet here as 
well, the fact that we are dealing with a written text must not be neglected. The point cannot just be to convince 
some Pythagoreans, but to convince us – if not of the soul’s immortality per se, than at least of the relevance of 
this topic. As Hyland himself points out in the end, the dialogues are “dialogues between Plato and us” (p. 271). 
21
 It might appear surprising that the Seventh Letter (and the Second Letter, in which it is stated that “there is no 
writing of Plato’s, nor will there ever be; those that are now called so come from an idealized and youthful 
Socrates,” 314c) are not being considered in the current article. There are several reasons for this. Most 
importantly, a letter does not have the feature of the written text which is described as problematic in the critique 
of writing: it does not “roll about everywhere” but has a specific addressee. Utilizing letters for philosophical 
argument thus already means disregarding this fact (and it is particularly ironic that the Second Letter states that 
this letter should be read again and again and then burned ….). Furthermore, the letters do not play an important 
role for the Straussians, and since a point of contact between the Tübingen School and the Straussians is sought 
here to be able to relate their esoteric approaches to each other, the critique of writing in the Phaedrus provides a 
much more suitable connection. 
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 argument gained elsewhere (i.e., in the Seventh Letter and other ancient sources) that Plato 
had an unwritten doctrine outside of the dialogues. Deriving this claim from the dialogues 
themselves would be problematic and even create a version of the liar’s paradox (“It is stated 
in the dialogues that the dialogues cannot be taken at face value”), and the traditional 
Tübingen School seems well aware of this. The conclusion drawn in the first section is thus 
confirmed: the traditional Tübingen School holds a theoretically more consistent position than 
Szlezák’s, yet requires turning away from the dialogues, which is dissatisfying for various 
reasons. 
 The reading of the critique of writing undertaken by the Straussians also concentrates 
on Socrates’ second argument, but in a rather different fashion and with different conclusions. 
We have already seen in the previous section that Strauss arrives at the rather optimistic 
conclusion that the Platonic dialogues have the flexibility of oral speech. Strauss does not 
really argue for or explain this thesis much; yet it is closely related to the critique of writing 
about which he states (just shortly before concluding that the Platonic dialogues have a 
response to this critique): “Plato’s Socrates discusses the literary question – the question 
concerning writings – in the Phaedrus. He says that writing is an invention of doubtful value. 
(…) Writings are essentially defective because they are equally accessible to all who can read 
or because they say the same things to everyone” (CM, 52). Since the context of this 
statement does not help much for clarifying it, we need to explore it for a moment to see what 
Strauss might be saying here. Strauss points out that the art of writing is an invention – a fact 
which will be discussed in the next section – and that it is of “doubtful value.” This 
characterization might imply that writing has an ambivalent position, as Seth Benardete will 
conclude and as we will examine in some detail in the next section. However, it seems that 
Strauss connects “doubtful” to the “defective” status of writing. This defectiveness, in turn, is 
based on Socrates’ second argument: the written text speaks to everybody in the same way. 
Socrates argues that this is because writing reaches “indiscriminately those with 
understanding no less than those who have no business with it” (275e).  
Both Socrates’ statement and Strauss’ claim could easily be interpreted in terms of an 
elitist view of philosophy, such that philosophy could only reach a few and not everybody. 
Moreover, Strauss’ formulation about the lesser value of writing might even seem to point to 
a moral inferiority of that which reaches everybody or the “many,” and thus indirectly of the 
“many.” However, Strauss does not use problematic expressions like the “few” or the “many” 
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here, and his final argument comes at the end of the sentence: writings “say the same things to 
everyone.” This is ultimately a pedagogical statement. There is no evidence in Strauss’ 
writings that he deemed certain people, or most people, unable to engage with philosophical 
texts.22 Rather, it seems a justified observation that different readers find themselves in 
different ‘places’ and have different degrees of philosophical preparation and hermeneutical 
sophistication. From Strauss’ perspective, the Platonic dialogues are particularly helpful in 
this respect because they can address readers differently, especially on a first level of access 
(which some people might find through stories, others through poetry, still others through a 
philosophical question or controversy). The art of careful reading or hermeneutics is then a 
matter of practice, and Platonic dialogues help us gain such practice. 
Yet Strauss’ own texts, and the texts of authors like Benardete and Rosen, also require 
a certain effort from the reader. The criticism so often raised against Strauss and the 
Straussians, namely, that their texts are “opaque” and “vague”23 is not entirely unfounded; yet 
it strikes me as more appropriate to describe their style of writing as abrupt. The reader is 
forced to engage with the claims made, either by examining an argument which is only made 
briefly, or even by filling in the argument for the claim. In a certain sense, the texts of the 
Straussians are themselves esoteric writings and ask the reader to practice by engaging with 
them – rather than showing in detail how an esoteric reading works. This might be a useful, 
but difficult exercise; it would be easier to read their interpretations if the Straussians made it 
more obvious whether they are summarizing, interpreting, or speculating.24  
A prime example of this technique and the difficulties connected with it can be found 
in Seth Benardete’s The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy. Benardete attends to the 
                                                 22
 The problem of elitism is explained well, with references to Strauss interpreters from both sides, in Batnitzky 
(2006), p. 164 ff. See also Kauffmann (2008) who examines some of the widespread assumptions about Strauss 
and argues that Strauss’ reading of Plato “never suggested to interpret the ‘philosophers-kings’ to be an 
advisable and practical political option, let alone appropriated it” into his own political theory (Kauffmann 
(2008), p. 88).   
23
 These terms are used, for example, in two reviews of Stanley Rosen’s Symposium: one by H.J. Easterling in 
The Classical Review, vol. 21, no. 3, 1971, pp. 362-64, the other by J.D. Moore in The American Journal of 
Philology, vol. 93, no. 4, 1972, pp. 612-16. 
24
 The speculations can be very interesting, provided they are designated as such. For example, Strauss suggests 
at the beginning of his reading of the Laws that the Athenian stranger might be Socrates in a Platonic thought-
experiment of sorts: “It thus suggests itself to us that if Socrates had escaped from prison, he would have gone to 
Crete, where he was wholly unknown and would have come to sight only as an Athenian stranger” (AAPL, 2) -- 
because in the Crito, Socrates only states that he would not want to go to one of the well-governed cities nearby, 
where he would be discredited by his unlawful escape, or to Thessaly, utterly lawless; so being an “Athenian 
stranger” in a lawful place like Crete could have been appealing. 
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Phaedrus and especially to the critique of writing in much more detail than Leo Strauss, and 
his observations are insightful and thought-provoking – yet it would be a lot easier to engage 
with them and build on them if Benardete elaborated on his suggestions. Especially striking is 
Benardete’s claim that Socrates is concerned with written laws rather than written texts in 
general. This claim will be investigated here, despite the difficulty that Benardete does not 
make it quite clear how the thesis is motivated. 
It is to Benardete’s credit that he, unlike many other interpreters of the critique of 
writing, provides a reading of the Phaedrus as a whole and thus attends also to those passages 
which address writing outside of the myth of Theuth. Commenting on Phaedrus’ question to 
Socrates about the potential shamefulness of writing and Socrates’ response that writing is not 
shameful per se, but only when done badly (258d), Benardete writes: “Writing in itself is 
never the issue in the Phaedrus. Phaedrus makes it clear that the issue is publication, and 
Socrates that it is the perpetuation of writings in the form of laws and decrees” (RMP, 157). 
To be sure, Socrates indeed brings up examples of politicians and lawgivers (Lycurgus, 
Solon, Darius) when Phaedrus asks him whether writing should be considered shameful. 
Phaedrus had raised the example of politicians (257d), and Socrates adds the example of 
lawgivers. In that sense, it is Socrates who brings law into the discussion. But does it follow 
that Socrates is only interesting in writings in the form of laws? And does it follow that the 
later discussion of writing, namely, Socrates’ interpretation of the myth of Theuth, also deals 
with law?  
Benardete claims that “the most sacred of writings are religious and legal” (RMP, 
157), and when he discusses the critique of writing, he makes reference to the unwritten laws 
in Sophocles’ Antigone (Ant. 454-55; RMP, 187), thus connecting the legal to the religious in 
the divine law. Such references are helpful for us to realize the different context of the Greeks 
who were certainly not surrounded by writings on an everyday basis like we are nowadays. 
Written laws constitute a significant and useful manifestation of writing, and in the written 
law, the twofold character of the law becomes manifest: legal texts are manmade, yet they 
also share the binding character of the divine law (but not to the same extent, as Antigone 
argues against Creon). The connections between writing and law are thus elucidating for an 
interpretation of the written text, and Benardete is right to point out that Socrates’ second 
argument against writing is closely linked to the argument in the Statesman (294a) that law 
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“by its very generality cannot cover all contingencies” (RMP, 189).25 The general 
accessibility of the written text and the generality of law are linked; but Benardete claims that 
Socrates’ second objection “is in itself a criticism of the law” (RMP, 189), thus holding on to 
his earlier claim that writing as such is never at issue in the Phaedrus.  
If Benardete developed his interesting claims about the intrinsic connection between 
writing and law (for Socrates) more explicitly and clearly, a discussion could emerge. But 
since Benardete presents this connection as if it was a fact rather than an interpretation, I 
return to my earlier concern: the need to differentiate between summaries, interpretations, and 
speculations, rather than letting the reader do this work. As it stands, I remain unconvinced by 
Benardete’s claim; it seems to me that writing as a phenomenon or the written text as such is 
being discussed in the dialogue and especially in the myth of Theuth, even though the written 
law can bring out certain features and problems more clearly. It is the phenomenon of writing 
to which we will now turn. 
 
IV. The Ambiguity of Writing 
 
Before the critique of writing occurs, Phaedrus suddenly brings up a hearsay argument 
against writing, claiming that “the most powerful and renowned politicians are ashamed to 
compose speeches or leave any writings behind” (257d). After Socrates has reminded 
Phaedrus of various famous politicians and lawgivers who did not reproach writing to the 
least, he summarizes the results as follows: “It’s not speaking or writing well that’s shameful; 
what’s really shameful is to engage in either of them shamefully or badly” (258d).  
Returning now to the myth of Theuth and the objections raised against writing, some 
aspects will be highlighted which the esoteric readings neglect; a full-fledged analysis of the 
critique of writing, however, goes beyond the confines of this essay. Concerning the myth of 
Theuth, it is important to note the fact that writing is introduced as an invention. An invention 
opens up a realm of possibilities that had not existed beforehand. Often, this means that the 
new invention can be applied to good usage as well as bad or harmful usage. If we keep in 
mind Socrates’ earlier conclusion that writing is not in itself anything shameful, it would 
                                                 25
 In his interpretation of the Statesman, Stanley Rosen writes that “nomos is the least mobile of writings” (Rosen 
(1997), p. 158), thus presenting law as writing in the emphatic sense. 
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appear plausible to investigate the useful as well as the harmful applications of this new 
invention. 
 Thamus’ objections are not really being considered by the esoteric readings, and at 
first glance, they indeed appear less philosophical than Socrates’ arguments. Yet the 
distinction between mere appearance and reality (of wisdom) in Thamus’ second argument is 
certainly worth noting. This distinction affirms the need to read and examine a text carefully 
without needing to ascribe to the author the intention of hiding something. Thamus speaks 
about a context of learning and the fact that students “will hear many things without being 
properly taught” (275a). While Thamus’ skepticism seems to arise from the temptation for 
students to read a lot and think they have understood without examining the subject matter 
carefully, it is not clear that a careless student might not just as well pick up lots of hearsay 
(i.e., spoken rather than written information) and thereby give the appearance of wisdom 
rather than being truly wise. This confirms Socrates’ earlier reminder that it is not writing per 
se which is problematic, but bad writing. Similarly, it is not learning from written texts which 
is harmful, but any learning that remains on a superficial level and accumulates rather than 
examines knowledge. Particularly striking are therefore Thamus’ formulations which bring up 
associations with Socrates: the students “will imagine that they have come to know much 
while for the most part they will know nothing” (275b) – in other words, unlike Socrates, they 
do not know that they know nothing. 
 The critique of writing as presented by Thamus and Socrates is certainly connected to 
Socrates’ refusal to write his philosophical ideas down, as interpreters have repeatedly 
pointed out. Yet it should also be noted that the objections raised by Thamus confirm 
Socrates’ ideas about teaching. Against the sophists with whom he critically engages in the 
Phaedrus, Socrates emphasizes that the process of learning does not consist in accumulating 
knowledge, be it presented in writing or speech, but in questioning the traditional conceptions 
in and through dialogue. What appears to be true needs to be questioned regarding its actual 
truth. 
 This emphasis is confirmed in a peculiar passage which occurs between Thamus’ 
objections (as reported by Socrates) and Socrates’ arguments. Phaedrus shows a strange 
reaction to the myth of Theuth; he states: “Socrates, you are very good at making up stories 
from Egypt or wherever else you want!” (275b). There is no need to consider this reaction or 
Socrates’ full response here; important, however, is Socrates’ final point that Phaedrus seems 
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to be concerned with “who is speaking and where he comes from” when he should really 
“consider whether what he says is right or wrong” (275c). This passage is usually ignored in 
the literature, especially by the esoteric readings; yet it constitutes a significant corrective or 
at least supplement to the critique of writing. Just as Socrates, before telling the myth of 
Theuth, had already emphasized that it is not writing as such which is good or shameful, he 
now reminds us that it should not matter who the speaker is and where he is coming from, but 
whether the statements are true or not. This should hold for any logos; especially in the case 
of written speech, where we might be unclear or mistaken about the author and where he or 
she is coming from, the question about the truth of what is being said is the only significant 
factor. We are thus receiving a reminder to read carefully and examine what we are being told 
regarding whether it strikes us as right or convincing. When considering the arguments 
brought forth by Theuth, Thamus, and Socrates, this also means that we must not take 
Socrates’ arguments as conclusive. It is our task to ask which statements are right. 
 It will thus also prove important to return to Theuth’s original arguments; yet we will 
first follow the course of the dialogue a bit further and consider Socrates’ objections which 
have been widely discussed in the literature, especially by the esoteric approaches, albeit in a 
one-sided fashion. In particular, the second objection has received much more attention than 
the first. In his first objection, Socrates starts from the similarity between painting and 
writing. This is an interesting moment because it evokes the famous passage from the 
Republic, Book 10, in which a painting is said to be the copy of a copy – the painted bed a 
copy of the wooden bed which is presented as a copy of the Form of the bed –, thus having 
“no grasp of the truth” (Rep. 600e). It would lead us too far away from our topic of writing to 
assess this difficult passage here. Suffice it to say that there are many reasons for concluding 
that the critique of painting in the Republic, which might seem even more straightforward 
than the critique of writing in the Phaedrus, is in fact equally complex. Interpreters often 
point to Plato’s inconsistency since he lets the poets be banned from the polis yet appreciates 
and uses poetry and myth. For some textual evidence concerning the complex status of art, 
one might point to the passage from the Republic where Socrates states that poetry should be 
allowed to “return from exile when it has successfully defended itself,” and that we would 
certainly all benefit if this was the case (Rep. 607d). Alternatively, the Phaedrus could be 
brought up where the mania of the muses is a divine gift because art is certainly not a matter 
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 of mere technique (and in that sense, not merely a copy of a copy!). In any case, what emerges 
is the ambiguity of painting rather than a straightforward reason for rejecting it. 
 As he explains his first objection, Socrates does not simply relate writing to painting, 
but focuses on a specific feature of both: when questioned, written or painted works remain 
silent. More precisely, they repeat the same thing again and again. This feature of 
repeatability is significant because it could be used to define the object at stake here, namely, 
a work (be it a written work or an artwork). A work is an object which stays self-same and 
repeats the same ‘message.’ As stated before, this characteristic could even be considered the 
strength of a work; it has the ability to stand in itself and “signify just that very same thing 
forever” (275d). Socrates says that this feature of the work is frustrating when we want to 
learn more from the work; yet we might wonder whether this frustration could lead to the 
realization that it is a different kind of learning which is called for here: a critical engagement 
with the work rather than an expectation to receive complete and final answers.  
 The features of the work that emerge from the first objection are confirmed by 
Socrates’ second objection, and especially by the initial part of the objection which the 
esoteric approaches tend to neglect. The written speech “rolls about everywhere,” like a ball, 
like an object (275e). It “rolls about” because it has a certain materiality and, in that sense, 
resembles a spatio-temporal object. The written text can be taken places – like the speech of 
Lysias under Phaedrus’ cloak. It can be stored up, even for generations to come. Yet indeed, 
the text is accessible to everybody who finds it, and there are definite dangers in this. The 
most precarious of these dangers are of a political nature, and in that sense, Strauss’ focus on 
the political appears justified. However, from a more strictly Platonic as well as from a 
contemporary perspective,26 we might wonder whether the dangers concern less the 
persecution of the writer than the realm of political propaganda more generally. 
 Yet it should also have become obvious that its material nature strengthens the written 
text. By way of the written speech, Lysias is (somewhat) present, as Socrates points out. 
Through the written dialogues, Plato and Socrates are in some sense present for us. Theuth is 
thus right to be proud of his invention: writing is a great reminder. Perhaps it even makes us 
                                                 26
 I have especially Emmanuel Levinas in mind here who maintains that the political state realizes itself through 
works; therefore, works are precarious: “From the work I am only deduced and am already ill-understood, 
betrayed rather than expressed” (TI, 176/151). Concerning the Platonic nature of Levinas’s concept of a work, 
see my [removed for blind review] 
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wiser; Theuth – in Socrates’ presentation of Theuth – does not spell out how the new 
invention would make the Egyptians wiser, but we can imagine what he may have in mind. 
Facts, insights, stories and discoveries can be recorded and shared. It has even been argued 
that the emergence and development of philosophy in ancient Greece was dependent on the 
possibility of writing.27 The systematic and logical development of thought certainly benefits 
from being recorded. 
 Writing thus proves an ambiguous phenomenon, a true pharmakon (as both Theuth 
and Thamus call it) in both senses: remedy and poison. The Greeks, perhaps unlike ourselves, 
were able to think this tension as necessary and inherent in the phenomenon.28 Pharmakon is 
not at all what we would call a homonym, or a term for two fundamentally different 
meanings. Ascribing ambiguity to the phenomenon of writing does not just mean that writing 
can be good or bad, helpful or harmful. It means that the very materiality which sustains and 
strengthens the written text at the same time makes it vulnerable. Or, to bring out the 
precarious nature of the written text more clearly, the self-sufficiency of the written text 
makes it possible for the text to close itself off, as it were. Being self-enclosed, the written 
text does not protest when being misread, but repeats the same message over and over again. 
 At the end of the discussion about writing there arises what might appear to be the 
most important objection to the reading attempted here: Socrates states that there is another 
kind of discourse which is “by nature better and more capable,” namely, the discourse “that is 
written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener” (276a). There might be different 
ways to make sense of the expression “better and more capable.” I suggest, partly in light of 
the earlier statement that writing is not shameful, to read “better” not as an ethical category 
(because ethical categories require a different kind of discussion), but as a pragmatic 
description, closely related to the other attribute: “more capable.” Oral speech is capable of 
certain accomplishments – especially in terms of responsivity, clarification, and discussion – 
which the written text fails to deliver. More precisely, the written text throws more 
responsibility on us, the readers: we need to respond to the challenge of the written text. 
                                                 27
 Vernant (1982). 
28
 Heidegger points this out in relation to the term deinon which is similar to pharmakon because it can mean 
“terrible” as well as “wonderful:” “The Greek word deinon has that uncanny ambiguity with which the saying of 
the Greeks traverses the opposed con-frontations [Aus-einander-setzungen] of Being” (IM, 159). 
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  Yet what about the strange formulation that the “living discourse” is that which is 
“written down (graphetai), with knowledge, in the soul of the listener” (276a)? The esoteric 
readings should certainly attend to this formulation since it is a crucial part of the critique of 
writing, occurring as Socrates is most critical of the written text, it seems. The Tübingen 
School and Szlezák in particular find themselves in the awkward position of having to read 
the statement as a mere metaphor or flawed expression (e.g., Szlezák, PSP, 10). But as 
Strauss reminds us, there are good reasons to assume that nothing is arbitrary in a Platonic 
dialogue, and especially not in the Phaedrus where it is stated that “every logos must be put 
together like a living creature, with a body of its own“ (264c). The formulation should thus be 
taken seriously; perhaps Plato is indeed indicating that there is a mutual dependence between 
oral and written speech, or a kind of circularity. As pointed out above, the written text is not 
entirely helpless, but has its own strength with which it can help discourse to become more 
stable in space and time. Yet, in turn, the written text needs to be revived by discussion and 
debate; hence the circularity. 
Benardete attends specifically to the passage about the speech as written in the soul. 
He points out that the same formulation is repeated (278a), thus making it even more obvious 
that Plato is not being sloppy here. When Benardete states that “what began in opposition 
ends up in an amalgam” and that the “ambiguous nature of writing is maintained to the end” 
(RMP, 191), I agree with the second, but not with the first statement. Ambiguity does not 
mean amalgamation; the challenge of ambiguity is that the conflicting elements cannot be 
brought to a synthesis. Benardete thus confirms the ambiguity of writing, but runs the risk of 
blurring the distinctions between oral speech and writing, especially when he softens the 
critique of writing by stating that the “defectiveness of writing seems to be no more or less 
than the defectiveness of any human being” (RMP, 189). Against such a statement, the 
essential distinction between oral and written speech needs to be maintained and makes the 
critique of writing valuable. 
In conclusion, the esoteric approaches have proven to be based on one-sided readings 
of the critique of writing. The Tübingen School in particular tends to read the critique of 
writing as demanding a dismissal of writing – a conclusion which requires disregarding other 
parts of the Phaedrus before and even within the critique of writing. Leo Strauss, in contrast, 
does not consider the critique to result in general problems with writing, but rather, in the 
possibility of hiding messages within the text and between the lines, as it were. He thus 
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stresses certain advantages of writing, but not really those possibilities of writing which 
follow from other parts of the passage in question, such as Theuth’s arguments.  
Both the Tübingen School and Straussians focus on the author and his intentions, in 
problematic ways, as we have seen. Here, Socrates’ reminder needs to be taken very 
seriously: the point is not who speaks, but whether what they say is true. Yet the real 
difficulty lies in finding out what is being said. This is where the esoteric approaches are 
absolutely right in emphasizing that we must not take Socrates’ statements to represent 
Plato’s views. Nor must we take Socrates’ more emphatic statements to be his final word. It is 
indeed important to consider carefully the dialogue setting and the other interlocutors (yet 
mostly through their presentation within the dialogues). Even more important is the insistence 
of the esoteric approaches to read Plato on several levels. What these levels are should not, to 
my mind, be determined by focusing on the author and his potential aim of hiding something, 
but rather, should be determined by the phenomenon in question and the different statements 
within the dialogue about this phenomenon. Concentrating on the phenomenon makes the 
interpretation much less speculative than a focus on the author’s intentions and secrets.  
Furthermore, the focus on the written text is true to Plato’s approach in this text since 
the questions of whether the written text helps memory and wisdom and whether the written 
text rolls about everywhere are under discussion here. The passage which is regularly taken to 
point to the author in fact contains a strange phrase. Socrates says that the written text 
“always needs its father’s support” (275e). Would it not be more appropriate to say that the 
text would have needed its father’s support, or that the text is lost because it cannot have its 
father’s support? If the text “always needs” this support, it is conceivable that this role can be 
taken up by somebody who is not the author of the text. Perhaps the text calls on us, the 
readers, to engage with it and revive it? Might not that which the text “always needs” be 
interpretation, discussion and dialogue? The fact that the text signifies the same thing over 
and over again means that it looks for its readers, even though they might be absent in a given 
moment, and that it is able to signify in this way despite the absence of the author.  
Where does this conclusion leave the Platonic dialogues, or what conclusions does the 
critique of writing have for the status of the dialogues? Is Strauss right to conclude that the 
critique of writing does not apply to them because they are as flexible as oral discourse, or do 
we still face the problem of the Tübingen School that the dialogues are simply what we are 
left with, despite all the flaws of the written text? Both these answers have proven 
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dissatisfying, the first because it disregards the essential difference between writing and 
speech, the second because it cannot methodologically justify the compromise it is forced 
into. If the diagnosis of the ambiguity of writing is convincing, we could conclude that the 
Platonic dialogues bring out this ambiguity more explicitly than other texts (e.g., through the 
different voices, settings, myths, and the explicit discussion of writing). Drew Hyland, 
although not explicitly concluding that writing has an ambiguous character, makes a very 
helpful suggestion concerning the relation between the dialogues and the critique of writing. 
He maintains that “Plato thought he had discovered in the dialogue form a mode of writing 
that would enable him to take the risk of writing, despite the qualified efficacy of the 
objections against it.”29 ‘Taking the risk’ is a very apt description because it shows that the 
risk cannot be ruled out or resolved; it is merely possible to take certain measures for facing 
the risk. However, the expression ‘risk’ makes it difficult to see the strength of the written 
text; ‘ambiguity’ is therefore the preferable expression for the interpretation provided in the 
current article.  
We can thus conclude that the written Platonic dialogues, which thematize the 
phenomenon of writing, are able not only to face the ambiguity of writing, but to disclose this 
very ambiguity. Since the Phaedrus examines the possibilities and shortcomings of the 
written text, it holds an essential role within the Platonic corpus, as the esoteric approaches 
rightly claim. Yet the need to read carefully arises from the ambiguity of the written text, not 
from the author’s intentions of hiding something. Ambiguity, in the sense described here, 
allows taking the objections against the written text seriously while still acknowledging 
Theuth’s excitement about his invention. Furthermore, it allows attributing the risks and the 
strengths to one and the same phenomenon: writing in its ambiguity. 
 
Tanya Staehler 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
                                                 29
 Hyland (2008), p. 132. 
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